In the late 1990s, tight restrictions on out-ofnetwork care in closed-panel health maintenance organization (HMO) plans were loosened in response to consumer complaints. Health plans that include out-of-network coverage have remained popular with employers and consumers; in 2010, 79% of individuals in a commercial plan were enrolled in either a preferred provider organization (PPO) plan, a point-of-service (POS) plan, or a consumerdirected health plan (CDHP), all of which typically provide some coverage for out-ofnetwork providers (Kaiser Family Foundation/ Health Research and Educational Trust 2011) .
To employers and insurers, the advantage of forming networks is the ability to negotiate reduced prices or, in some cases, choose providers based on the historic profile of the value of care delivered. Generally, cost-sharing in health care is intended to reduce moral hazard by making consumers at least partially responsible for the costs of the health care they use. However, increased cost-sharing for seeing an out-of-network provider also incentivizes consumers to use a select group of providers. Consumers sensitive to out-ofpocket price are more likely to choose innetwork providers (Rosenthal, Li, and Milstein 2009) , steering market share to these providers. Individuals typically will obtain most of their care in-network, but out-of-network care is not uncommon. The latest research available, conducted by McDevitt et al. (2007) , used data from Watson Wyatt's 2003 medical claims database and found that in-network care accounted for 87% to 90% of covered expenses, up from approximately 75% in the mid-1990s.
Consumers using an out-of-network provider are generally responsible for higher copayments or coinsurance compared to using an innetwork provider. They are also responsible for any ''balance billing'' charges, or an additional payment equal to the difference between the provider's billed charge (i.e., list price) and the maximum amount the insurer is willing to pay for the service. Out-of-network providers are not limited to an insurer fee schedule when setting prices and often charge more than insurers are willing to reimburse. The methods insurers use to calculate provider reimbursement for out-of-network services vary by plan, but most commonly reimbursement is capped using either a percentage (usually 140% to 250%) of the Medicare rate or the usual and customary rate (UCR). Though there is no one generally accepted UCR formula, it is often calculated employing a stated percentile (e.g., 80
th percentile) of all billed charges for a specific service in a geographic area. The consumer is then responsible for any coinsurance on the UCR, the deductible, and the balance bill amount.
While there is evidence that at least some providers have list prices exceeding 10 (or even 1,000) times the Medicare rate (America's Health Insurance Plans, 2009) , there is little objective data on net consumer out-of-pocket payments for out-of-network care. This is because some out-of-network providers do not balance bill (accepting the payment offered by the insurer), negotiate with consumers on price, or, even if they do balance bill, do not pursue unpaid bills for out-of-network care, potentially writing them off as bad debt. Also, some insurers may negotiate with out-of-network providers on behalf of consumers or hold consumers harmless from additional payments above the in-network cost-sharing requirements, especially for emergency or hospitalbased physicians at in-network hospitals. McDevitt et al. (2007) There is also evidence that cost-sharing for using an out-of-network provider is increasing. A 2011 PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey of employers on their most common plan found that deductibles for out-of-network care may be increasing relative to in-network deductibles; from 2010 to 2011, the percentage of plans with out-of-network deductibles over $1,000 increased 15 percentage points (29% to 44%) as compared to a six-percentage-point growth in plans with in-network deductibles over $1,000 (16% to 22%). Also, the growing popularity of high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) may be contributing to increases in out-of-pocket payments for out-of-network services. Some HDHPs do not allow costs related to out-of-network care to apply toward the general deductible (PriceWaterhouseCoopers Health Research Institute 2011).
Increasingly, major insurers are reimbursing out-of-network providers as a percentage of the Medicare rate rather than the usual customary rate. Since the Medicare rate is often lower than the UCR, this practice, in effect, increases balance billing for the con- 
Problems
In some cases, use of an out-of-network provider is not an informed or voluntary choice. Whether or not a provider is innetwork, the amount the insurer will reimburse, and the amount an out-of-network provider will require the consumer to pay are often not transparent to consumers. For some specialties and some geographic areas, access to innetwork providers may be limited, making some patients feel compelled to use an out-ofnetwork provider. Emergency services also may be provided by out-of-network providers. In some cases, other hospital-based providers, such as anesthesiologists or radiologists, are not chosen by the consumer and may be out-ofnetwork even when the hospital where the consumer is receiving care is in-network. We describe these problems subsequently.
Lack of Information on Network Participation and Cost Transparency
Consumers may rely on inadequate or outdated directories to determine provider network participation. One study in Puerto Rico found 25% of managed behavioral health organization (MBHO) phone numbers or addresses were incorrect (Albizu-Garcia et al. 2004) . A similar study in Connecticut examined hard-copy lists of network providers distributed by HMOs, and found that 7% of providers were not listed as being in-network on the plan website, and an additional 15% were listed inaccurately (Barry, Venkatesh, and Busch 2008) .
Consumers deciding whether to use an outof-network provider may also find it difficult to uncover the cost implications. Balance billing and the UCR calculation are complex concepts. Compounding this, most providers do not publish list prices for their services and insurers do not typically make out-ofnetwork reimbursement schedules available to their enrollees. Consumers' ability to use numeric information to comprehend health insurance benefits is notoriously low (Nielsen-Bohlman, Panzer, and Kindig 2004) , and this problem may be worse with respect to out-of-network care. Plans may or may not allow out-of-network cost-sharing or balance billing to contribute to a consumer's annual out-of-pocket maximum. Some plans have a separate annual limit for out-of-network expenses. Together these issues may make it difficult for consumers to understand and predict their out-of-pocket responsibilities for out-of-network services.
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Network Inadequacy
Consumers may feel compelled to use an outof-network provider if an appropriate innetwork provider is not available within a reasonable distance of their homes. State policies to ensure network adequacy vary; for example, states may require insurers to report provider-to-enrollee ratios or statistics related to driving distance to providers (National Health Policy Forum 2010). California recently became the first state to add wait time for an appointment to network adequacy standards (State of California Department of Managed Health Care 2010). State legal protections may also vary by type of plan (e.g., HMO vs. PPO).
Adequacy of provider networks is affected by geography, provider type, the absolute number of providers, the amount of provider competition, and insurer policies, including reimbursement. Blue Cross Blue Shield reports that nationally about 8% of its emergency room visits are out-of-network, but this percentage varies significantly between states to a high of 41% (Federal Register 2010) . The western region of the U.S. has relatively high rates of providers who do not participate in insurer networks (Boukus, Cassil, and O'Malley 2009 ). Some specialties have noticeably lower provider participation rates. For example, one study found that 35% of psychiatrists do not participate in managed care networks (O'Malley and Reschovsky 2009). Regier et al. (2008) found that among Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan members in Washington, D.C., less than 50% of mental health patients were receiving care from an in-network provider. However, it is not clear if low mental health provider participation rates correlate with difficulty accessing an in-network provider. Barry, Venkatesh, and Busch (2008) found that for six Connecticut HMOs, scheduling with a mental health social worker was not a major problem, though access to a psychiatrist was more difficult.
Provider competition is a powerful incentive to participate in a managed care network; if providers have an insufficient supply of patients without network participation, they will have a strong incentive to contract with an insurer. Lack of competition creates different incentives; if all the anesthesiologists in an area are in the same practice, they may have little incentive other than patient satisfaction to accept reduced payment rates offered by an insurer for their essential service.
Health system consolidation may also have unintended consequences for whether specific providers are included in a network. In a high-profile ongoing dispute, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center announced it would not renew its contract with Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield after the insurer revealed plans to buy a rival hospital (Mathews, and Miller 2012) .
In 2011, as one of six strategies to control costs, the attorney general of Massachusetts specifically called for increased use of limited network plans that exclude high-cost provider systems and tiered networks which require consumers to pay more for lower-value providers (Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General 2011). This has already occurred in some markets, with the introduction of limited network plans that exclude high-cost hospital systems (Abelson 2010; Andrews 2011a ; PriceWaterhouseCoopers Health Research Institute 2011; Snowbeck 2011).
Emergency Care
In a medical emergency, a patient often must go to the closest emergency room for medical reasons, or because ambulances are required to go to the nearest hospital. This hospital may not be in the patient's insurer network, though some plans do not hold consumers responsible for additional out-of-network cost-sharing for emergency room services. However, consumers may be balance billed for out-of-network ambulance services, just as they are for emergency room providers.
Balance billing for emergency services has long been a controversial topic among stakeholders. Physician groups such as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) argue for preservation of balance billing, maintaining that it is necessary to make up for routine underpayment by insurers. In addition, because physicians are required to treat patients in the emergency room under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), they argue that remuneration at their listed prices is necessary (American College of Emergency Physicians 2009; American Medical Association 2012). Insurers counter that charges billed by out-ofnetwork providers are often unreasonable, and thus they should not be required to pay inordinately high payments for services (Mathews 2008) .
Hospital-Based Providers
Involuntary use of other hospital-based providers, such as anesthesiologists, radiologists, neonatologists, or pathologists, is a growing problem (Andrews 2011b; Kolata 2009; Mathews 2008; Raeburn 2009 ). Hospital-based providers do not typically inform patients that they are out-of-network before delivering care. For some specialties, such as radiology or pathology, patients may not even come in contact with the out-of-network provider. While a hospital may be in-network, providers treating patients at that hospital may not be in a particular network. This means that though a patient may check before routine surgery to ensure that a hospital is in her insurer's network, during her surgery she may receive services from an out-of-network assistant surgeon or anesthesiologist, which essentially would be impossible to refuse. The patient may not discover the provider is out-of-network until she is billed for the service. Though many hospitalbased providers practice fair billing practices, recent lawsuits highlight abuses: Aetna recently sued eight New Jersey physicians for ''unconscionable'' out-of-network fees at innetwork hospitals, including a charge of more than $50,000 for an inpatient cardiology consultation (Gallegos 2011; Waldman 2011) .
Policy Solutions
Issues concerning lack of information on network participation and cost transparency, network inadequacy, and involuntary out-ofnetwork use from emergency and other hospital-based providers have garnered the attention of federal and state policymakers. They are also addressed in important provisions in the Affordable Care Act.
Lack of Information on Network Participation and Cost Transparency
Several states have championed improving transparency of out-of-network prices and protecting consumers from involuntary outof-network charges, either through legislation or the courts. In New York, the accuracy of insurers' calculation of the UCR was called into question in 2009 during investigations by the state attorney general and the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. The attorney general alleged conflict of interest between UnitedHealth Group and Ingenix, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group that managed the database used to calculate the UCR, leading to charges of faulty data collection methods, poor pooling procedures and lack of audits. The investigation concluded that these faulty practices often resulted in an inappropriately low UCR and thus low reimbursement to providers and higher than expected out-ofpocket payment for consumers (U. Mediation is available only for participants in PPOs or the public employee plan and for charges from out-of-network, hospital-based physicians if the service is performed at an innetwork hospital and if charges exceed $1,000 (after deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and amounts paid by the insurer or administrator) (Texas Department of Insurance 2012).
Health reform implementation has broad implications for out-of-network coverage. Insurers will be required to provide details on their plans using plain language and a standardized form called ''Summary of Benefits and Coverage (SBC),'' which may help consumers navigate the complex jargon of out-of-network coverage (Federal Register 2012b) . The provision on transparency in coverage (Section 2715A Public Health Service Act, Section 1311(e) ACA) requires plans to disclose ''information on cost-sharing and payments with respect to any out-of-network coverage.'' Though guidance has yet to be released, one suggestion is that plans be required to report how frequently consumers use out-of-network providers and how much they spend on out-of-pocket costs. This would provide some information for consumers to evaluate plans on their access to innetwork providers and the related costs (Pollitz and Levitt 2012) . State health insurance exchanges may have a role in improving health insurance transparency, offering tools to help consumers understand their costsharing responsibilities across plans for outof-network care and determine for which plans their current providers are in-network (Blumberg and Pollitz 2009 ).
Network Inadequacy
In the final rule on ''Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans'' for the ACA, which was released March 2012, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) indicated that qualified plans include essential community providers and ''maintain a network that is sufficient in number and types of providers, including providers that specialize in mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that all services will be accessible without unreasonable delay'' (Federal Register 2012a). With this broad guidance, significant flexibility is granted to the individual state exchanges in defining network adequacy; however, since many states may choose to default into a federally facilitated exchange, HHS will need to create a more specific definition (Jost 2012) .
Emergency Care
For the problem of involuntary emergency out-of-network care, the ACA acknowledges that consumers may be unable to find an innetwork provider in an emergency. The law takes the approach of regulating insurers; it requires that plans not impose higher copayments or coinsurance for out-of-network emergency room providers. Insurers must also reimburse (at a minimum) the greatest of three possible amounts: ''1) the amount negotiated with in-network providers for the emergency service furnished; 2) the amount for the emergency service calculated using the same method the plan generally uses to determine payments for out-of-network services (such as the usual, customary, and reasonable charges) but substituting the in-network cost-sharing provisions for the out-of-network cost-sharing provisions; or 3) the amount that would be paid under Medicare for the emergency service''(Federal Register 2010). Notably, balance billing by the provider is still allowed, although the rules on minimum insurer reimbursement may reduce the amounts that providers will balance bill (Andrews 2010) . These provisions do not apply to grandfathered plans 3 or other cost-sharing requirements for out-of-network services such as deductibles or out-of-pocket limits.
While the ACA continues to allow for balance billing for out-of-network emergency room services, some state-level laws prohibit this practice. For example, in 2009 the California Supreme Court upheld a state regulation that banned balance billing of HMO members by emergency room providers (Greene 2009 ). To protect consumers from out-of-network ambulance services, several states have instituted legislation that requires insurers to reimburse 911 responders directly (Andrews 2011c; Chasse 2011 ).
Hospital-Based Providers
Illinois enacted legislation in June 2011 that requires insurers to disclose that there is limited coverage for out-of-network providers and to ensure that consumer out-of-pocket responsibility for charges from out-of-network, hospitalbased physicians at in-network hospitals is not greater than what would be incurred in-network; the law also establishes a process for arbitration between the insurer and provider (Illinois Public Act 096-1533 (HB 5085) 2011). Another policy option adopted by Maryland in 2010 is to have plans honor assignment of benefits 4 for hospitalbased physicians and adhere to minimum reimbursement requirements, but not allow physicians under assignment of benefits to balance bill (Maryland Senate Bill 314 2010) . This compromise allows out-of-network providers to receive prompt payment directly from the insurer while protecting consumers from unexpected balance bills.
Conclusions
Federal and state policymakers are currently working to construct legislation that increases transparency and protects consumers against unexpected or unreasonable out-of-network charges, while still balancing the interests of providers and insurers. Optimal policy solutions need to consider health care prices (net of rebates) and costs, provider supply, consumer preferences related to provider choice, and the value derived from provider networks. Policy solutions also need to balance interests of multiple stakeholders; holding consumers harmless from involuntary out-of-network charges requires either restricting provider balance billing and/or increasing insurer reimbursement.
With respect to network participation and cost, there seems to be consensus among stakeholders regarding the need for greater transparency, similar to other calls for greater public disclosure of cost information (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). As described previously, Texas has mandated that providers bear the burden of disclosure. Regarding network participation transparency, insurers or employers (or health plan exchanges) may be best equipped to provide this information in a way that is consistent across plans, relatively inexpensive, and easy for enrollees to access. With respect to cost transparency, at a minimum insurance plans could be required to disclose the fees paid to out-of-network providers for specific services, and providers could be required to disclose their list prices to consumers. This would allow consumers to calculate balance bill amounts for individual service units, although it would still be difficult to calculate total out-of-pocket payments for an episode of care. It should be noted that previous efforts at public reporting of cost information have not been widely used by consumers, possibly because information is not presented in ways that are meaningful or accessible (Farrell et al. 2010; Tu and Lauer 2009 ; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011).
Under the ACA, network adequacy will have to be regulated by states for plans in health care exchanges. However, plans may still be constrained by the number of available providers given expected workforce shortages due to significant insurance expansions under the ACA.
Related to emergency care, the approach taken in the ACA with respect to out-ofnetwork emergency room services is to prohibit higher cost-sharing and set minimum guidelines for insurer reimbursement in an attempt to reduce balance billing. This approach seems reasonable, although providers may feel the revenue received does not adequately cover their costs and they may continue to balance bill. Yet, the costs received by the hospital in these cases will be at minimum what the hospital receives from Medicare for the service, and more in most cases (i.e., the private insurance innetwork rate in the region).
Perhaps the thorniest issue relates to hospitalbased providers, where increasing transparency is least likely to change behavior. If a hospitalbased provider discloses she is out-of-network but no in-network provider is available, should the consumer still be held liable for out-ofnetwork costs? Cheryl Fish-Parcham of Families USA, a consumer advocacy group, recently stated, ''Price transparency can sometimes help consumers minimize balance billing, but transparency is meaningless in circumstances when you don't have a choice of providers.'' As a condition for hospital practice privileges, hospitals could require their hospital-based providers to participate in networks for which the facility is in-network.
While carefully chosen provider networks are a powerful tool with the potential to steer patients to higher-value health care providers, policymakers should be mindful of potential problems including lack of accurate information on network participation and cost transparency, network inadequacy, and involuntary use of emergency and other hospital-based providers. For these plans to be palatable to a wide range of consumers and purchasers, these problems will need to be addressed. It is important that regulators have greater availability of price data that include all aspects of price (e.g., rebates, discounts, collected rather than billed amounts) and information on the value of networks, including potential cost-saving and quality effects. This information will enable policymakers to better assess the need for regulation and to construct a policy approach that ensures adequate provider reimbursement and prohibits insurers from having to pay inordinately high prices for services, yet also protects consumers against excessive out-of-network charges.
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1 This problem relates to both the decision to choose a plan (an often more expensive one) that allows for out-of-network service use, as well as the decision to use out-of-network services. If consumers underestimate the outof-pocket costs of out-of-network service use, they may overestimate the value of plans that offer this option. 2 In exclusive provider organization (EPO) plans, consumers must use in-network providers and hospitals; no out-of-network coverage is provided except in emergencies. 3 Grandfathered plans are those that existed on March 23, 2010, when the Affordable Care Act became a law. In order to maintain grandfathered status plans cannot eliminate or reduce benefits to treat a condition, raise co-insurance or significantly raise copayments, deductibles, or the share of the premium the employer pays, reduce or add an annual limit, or change insurers (excluding self-insured plans). 4 Without assignment of benefits, the consumer is billed by the provider then reimbursed by the insurer. If a consumer assigns her benefits to her insurer, the provider is paid directly by the insurer.
